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INTRODUCTION  
 
As the forces of globalization push people, capital, and ideas 
across national borders, the actions of people and organizations in one 
country increasingly affect people outside that country.1 Disputes are 
inevitable and litigation involving parties from different countries has 
proliferated since World War II.2 More than ever, domestic courts are 
asked to resolve some of these international disputes, which often 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.B.A., Management and Organizations, 2007, University of Iowa.  
1 See National Boundaries Become Less Important in a Global Age, CENTER 
ON LAW & GLOBALIZATION (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:40 PM), 
http://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=40 (noting that the massive 
regional and global flows of people, capital, culture, and information are blurring the 
distinction between domestic and foreign law). 
2 See Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the Fact Approach to 
Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 
613, 616 (1967) (discussing the proliferation of international litigation after World 
War II). 
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requires them to analyze and apply foreign law.3 For example, 
domestic courts frequently confront foreign law issues when deciding 
a case involving the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA),4 
interpreting a commercial contract governed by the law of a foreign 
country,5 or judging the validity of a foreign money judgment being 
enforced in the United States.6  
Historically, domestic courts took a “fact approach” to 
determining foreign law issues, meaning that courts treated foreign 
law issues as raising a question of fact.7 As Professor Miller stated in 
his famous treatise on foreign law, if the fact approach “represented 
only a perversion of nomenclature, it would be of little consequence.”8 
However, treating foreign law as a question of fact had a number of 
questionable practical consequences.9 It forced the party relying on 
foreign law to raise the issue in the pleadings or risk dismissal based 
on motions presented under local procedural rules.10 It required proof 
through evidence, a process that was complicated by the local 
                                                 
3 The issue of domestic courts deciding issues of foreign law is completely 
different from the much-publicized debate about the use of foreign law to interpret 
the United States Constitution, a topic not addressed herein. 
4 For example, a person charged with violating the anti-bribery laws of the 
FCPA can claim as a defense that the payment was legal under the written laws of 
the foreign country. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(c) (2006) (discussing affirmative defenses).  
5 See, e.g., Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 
2010) (interpreting stock purchase agreement governed by French law). 
6 See, e.g., Society of Llyod’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(comparing the English legal system to the American legal system). 
7 See Miller, supra note 2 at 617 (“Anglo-American courts and commentators 
historically have characterized a foreign-law issue as a question of fact to be pleaded 
and proved as a fact by the party whose cause of action or defense depends upon 
alien law.”).  
8 Id. at 620.  
9 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2441 (3d ed. 2010) (summarizing the undesirable practical 
consequences that resulted from regarding foreign law as raising a question of fact).  
10 See id. 
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evidence rules.11 It implied that juries and not the court should 
interpret the meaning of the foreign law,12 forcing laypersons to 
perform complex legal analysis even though most had no legal 
background. Also, in theory, it required appellate courts to engage in a 
limited review of foreign law issues since questions of fact are 
reviewed under deferential standards such as the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.13 This meant that appellate courts had less 
discretion to overturn lower court decisions that misinterpreted the 
foreign law.14  
In reality, many states never fully embraced the common law 
approach to determining foreign law,15 particularly the notion that the 
jury was the appropriate body to determine foreign law. For example, 
in 1936 the National Conference on Uniform State Laws and the 
American Bar Association approved the Uniform Judicial Notice of 
Foreign Law Act, which contained a comment section that stated 
“foreign law [is] determinable by the judge, not the jury, thus changing 
the absurd old common law.”16 Other states passed statutes that 
modified the traditional common law approach, but there was no 
uniform or consistent way that courts handled foreign law issues and 
most adopted some variation of the fact approach.17 Those who have 
reviewed the history of foreign law issues in domestic court lament the 
tremendous inconsistency in approaches and “tenacious retention of 
archaic dogma . . . that had the sole virtue of being harmonious with 
the fact characterization of foreign law.”18 Professor Miller, in 
particular, has called the fact approach a relic of the English common 
                                                 
11 See id. 
12 Id. 
13 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 2446.  
14 See id. (listing examples of appellate cases that set aside the trial court’s 
decision only if it were clearly erroneous).  
15 See Miller, supra note 2 at 624 (reviewing statutes passed in the 1800s that 
modified the common law view of foreign law).  
16 Id. at 624–26 (discussing the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act 
and other legislative modification of the common law approach). 
17 Id. at 625.  
18 Id. at 624.  
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law system that needlessly divorced the procedures for determining 
domestic law from the procedures for determining foreign law.19 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 (“Rule 44.1”) was 
designed to cure the problems associated with the fact approach by 
giving judges a more flexible framework for determining foreign law 
issues.20 Adopted in 1966, Rule 44.1 sounded the “death-knell”21 for 
the fact approach by making clear that foreign law determinations 
“must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”22 Analytically, 
defining foreign law as a question of law had the reciprocal 
consequences of treating foreign law as a question of fact. Foreign law 
no longer had to be raised in the pleadings23; after Rule 44.1, issues 
involving foreign law “should be argued and briefed like domestic 
law.”24 Many courts had questioned the traditional requirement of 
pleading foreign law after the adoption of Federal Rule 8(a)(2), which 
was designed to liberalize pleading standards,25 but characterizing 
foreign law as an issue of fact ended the disagreement.26 Second, 
characterizing foreign law as law means that the parties need not 
“prove” the law by presenting evidence to the judge.27 The judge may 
perform independent research on what the law is and give the 
materials unearthed by that research whatever probative value he or 
she thinks appropriate, regardless of whether the materials would be 
                                                 
19 See id. at 748 (“This classification, which originally was employed by the 
English courts for purposes that in retrospect appear to have little relevance to 
existing conditions, permeated the entire process for proving alien law and 
obfuscated the functional similarity between domestic and foreign-law issues.”).  
20 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
21 See Miller, supra note 2 at 615 (dubbing the adoption of Rule 44.1 the 
“death knell” for the fact approach to foreign law).  
22 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
23 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9. 
24 Eschelbach v. CCF Charterhouse/Credit Commercial de France, No. 01 Civ. 
1778(FM), 2006 WL 27094, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2006) (quoting Anglo Am. Ins. 
Group, P.L.C. V. CalFed, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
25 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.  
26 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9.  
27 See id. 
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admissible under the applicable rules of evidence.28 Third, the court, 
not a jury, decides questions of law.29 Though Rule 44.1 does not 
explicitly state that the judge should decide foreign law questions—the 
enabling act for the federal rules prevents it from allocating functions 
between the court and jury—there is no doubt that the judge should 
decide foreign law questions.30 Fourth, characterizing foreign law as a 
question of law ended any question as to the scope of appellate review 
of foreign law decisions. Before Rule 44.1, most courts fully reviewed 
the lower court’s determination of foreign law, but others set aside the 
lower court decision “only if it was clearly erroneous.”31 Rule 44.1 
ended the split by stating that the trial “court’s determination must be 
treated as a ruling on the question of law.”32 Therefore, lower court 
determinations of foreign law are now reviewed de novo, as are any 
other questions of law.33  
However, Rule 44.1 did not sound the death knell for the fact 
approach entirely because judges cannot determine foreign law issues 
the same way they determine domestic law issues. The drafters of Rule 
44.1 recognized that determining foreign law requires procedures not 
typically authorized in domestic law cases.34 The most prominent 
example is Rule 44.1’s approval of expert testimony,35 a fact-based 
procedure that is clearly in tension with the Rule’s declaration that 
foreign law issues are questions of law, since domestic law issues are 
                                                 
28 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
29 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 2445.  
30 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. advisory committee’s note (citing treatises that 
argue foreign law issues should be decided by the court and listing cases that have 
reached that same conclusion even before Rule 44.1).  
31 Id. at § 2446.  
32 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e 
review the district court’s findings regarding [the foreign law] de novo.”).  
34 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (authorizing both evidentiary type procedures and 
independent research of the foreign law by the judge). 
35 Id. 
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not determined by reference to expert opinions.36 Regardless, the use 
of expert opinions remains one of the most common37—and 
controversial38—ways to “prove” foreign law. The end product is an 
analytically inconsistent, but pragmatic approach to determining 
foreign law. (After all, judges are not expected to be comparative law 
scholars). Thus, even after Rule 44.1, foreign law sits in a sort of legal 
“Neverland”—not purely an issue of law nor purely an issue of fact.  
This Note examines a 2010 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case 
that debates the propriety of using foreign law experts after Rule 44.1, 
perhaps due to the fact that Rule 44.1 approves both expert testimony 
(a fact-based procedure) and independent research by the judge (a 
procedure consistent with the way domestic law is determined).39 In 
Bodum USA Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that the 
final version of a contract governed by French law permitted the 
defendant to sell a product design anywhere except France.40 Although 
the panel of judges agreed on the outcome of the case, they disagreed 
over what sources judges should use to determine foreign law.41 
Specifically, Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner wrote that judges 
should rely on official translations of foreign law or scholarly treatises 
about foreign law, if available.42 They criticized the use of foreign law 
experts, primarily because experts are paid for their analysis and 
strategically selected by the parties to help their case.43 However, in 
                                                 
36 See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting expert testimony when it will assist the 
trier of fact to determine a fact in issue). 
37 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 2446 (listing numerous cases 
where experts testified as to the scope, meaning, or application of foreign law). 
38 See 2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 335 (Strong, ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“[Expert 
testimony] seems to maximize the expense and delay and hardly seems best 
calculated to ensure a correct decisions by our judges on questions of foreign law.”).  
39 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
40 Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 631 (7th. Cir. 2010). 
41 See infra Part II (discussing t iffering views of all three judges in Bodum 
concerning the use of experts to prov oreign law). 
he d
e f
42 Bodum USA, 621 F.3d at 628–32 (Posner, J., concurring).  
43 Id. at 628 (“Trying to establish foreign law through experts’ declarations . . . 
adds an adversary’s spin, which the court then must discount”). 
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her concurring opinion, Judge Wood wrote that exercises in 
comparative law are notoriously difficult and that simply reviewing an 
official translation of a law or treatise may not be enough to apply 
foreign law accurately.44  
Bodum highlights the theoretical and practical challenges 
domestic judges face when interpreting foreign law. Among the most 
important are (1) language barriers, (2) the judge’s unfamiliarity with 
the foreign legal system, and (3) the reality that the law does not 
always function as it is written due to unofficial and underground 
elements of legal systems.45 Once these challenges are understood, it 
is easy to see why Rule 44.1 sacrifices analytical consistency to 
improve the chances the judge determines foreign law accurately. 
                                                
The intriguing question, and the focus of this Note, is how federal 
courts overcome these challenges when analyzing foreign law issues 
using the blueprint provided in Rule 44.1. Part I discusses the text and 
purpose of Rule 44.1. Part II reviews the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of 
the foreign law issue in Bodum, focusing on its disapproval of the use 
of foreign law experts and approval of written sources of foreign law. 
Part III argues that the Bodum methodology, which instructs the trial 
judge to determine the foreign law by researching written sources of 
the foreign law and to disregard the testimony of foreign law experts 
in the great majority of cases, does not properly account for the 
challenges inherent in determining foreign law and reads out some of 
the most important parts of Rule 44.1. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT – RULE 44.1 
 
Though this Note focuses on how domestic courts deal with 
foreign law issues today, American courts have always confronted 
foreign law issues. America inherited the English common law and 
international treaties signed by the United States have often 
incorporated international or foreign law. In its early years, the 
 
44 Id. at 639 (Wood, J. concurring). 
45 See infra Part II (analyzing the challenges faced by domestic judges when 
deciding foreign law issues).  
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Supreme Court cited English cases and statutes as non-binding but 
persuasive,46 took judicial notice of laws of territories acquired by the 
United States that were previously subject to the laws of another 
country,47 interpreted land grants under French law,48 and 
acknowledged the role of experts in proving “unwritten” foreign law.49 
However, as the world has become more globalized, national 
boundaries are becoming less important,50 resulting in a rapid increase 
in the number of foreign law cases in domestic courts.51 Just as people 
are no longer surprised to see German cars on American roads, or 
Chinese household goods on Wal-Mart shelves, people should no 
longer be surprised to see cases that turn on interpretations of German 
or Chinese law being decided by American courts. 
Rule 44.1, adopted in 1966, sets out the basic parameters for 
determining these foreign law cases in federal court. It provides: 
 
A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign 
country's law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. 
In determining foreign law, the court may consider any 
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or 
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal 
                                                 
46 See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) (“The interpretation of the 
constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its 
provisions are framed in the language of the English common law.”); United States 
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (relying on English common law principles and 
statutes to determine the meaning of the phrase “citizen of the United States” in the 
Constitution).  
47 United States v. Perot, 98 U.S. 428 (1878) (announcing that the court would 
take judicial notice of Mexican law in force in Texas before Texas became a U.S. 
state). 
48 See Strother v. Lucas, 31 U.S. 763 (1832). 
49 See Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400, 401 (1852) (“Unwritten foreign laws, must 
be proved by experts.”).  
50 See National Boundaries Become Less Important in a Global Age, supra 
note 1 (discussing how territorial boundaries of states are becoming less important in 
the globalization era). 
51 See Miller, supra note 2 at 616 (noting that international litigation has 
increased after World War II). 
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Rules of Evidence. The court's determination must be treated 
as a ruling on a question of law.52 
 
 A. The Notice Requirement  
 
Prior to Rule 44.1, because foreign law was characterized as a 
question of fact, the party relying on foreign law had to raise that fact 
in the pleadings.53 Insufficiently pleading the foreign law issue 
typically resulted in the court dismissing the complaint with leave to 
replead.54 Rule 44.1 simplified the procedure for raising foreign law 
by simply requiring the party relying on foreign law to give reasonable 
written notice that it intends to do so in “a pleading or other 
writing.”55 The purpose of such notice is to prevent “unfair surprise” 
that a case involves foreign law and give the opposing side (and the 
court) time to research the foreign law, which “often will not be as 
familiar to the parties” as domestic law.56 There can be severe 
consequences when a party does not provide reasonable notice. For 
example, in In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litigation, the 
appellate court refused to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss based 
on its foreign law defense because the defendant could not provide a 
reasonable explanation for its failure to assert the defense in the 
district court case.57 Similarly, in other cases where the party does not 
give reasonable notice under Rule 44.1, the court has assumed the 
party waived its right to apply foreign law in the case or presumed that 
the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum state.58  
                                                 
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
53 See Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 444 
(1889) (“The law of Great Britain since the declaration of independence is the law of 
a foreign country, and, like any other foreign law, is matter of fact, which the courts 
of this country cannot be presumed to be acquainted with, or to have judicial 
knowledge of, unless it is pleaded and proved.”). 
54 See Miller, supra note 2 at 639. 
55 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (emphasis added). 
56 See Id. advisory committee’s note. 
57 See 334 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
58 See, e.g., Cary v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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 B. Materials / Sources of Foreign Law  
 
Although Rule 44.1 permits the judge to research the foreign law 
issue on his or her own,59 the use of foreign law experts remains 
prevalent in foreign law cases.60 The weight that courts will afford the 
foreign law material presented by the parties, including testimony 
from experts, often turns on the individual facts of the case. 
Nevertheless, a few general patterns emerge. First, in many cases, 
judges conduct independent research if the parties inadequately or 
unfairly present the foreign law,61 which is not surprising given the 
advisory comments to Rule 44.1 state that courts should do so under 
those circumstances.62 For example, in Carlisle Ventures, Inc. v. Banco 
Espanol de Creditor, the court discounted the affidavit of a well-
known Spanish attorney and former law professor because his 
interpretation of Spanish law was not supported by case law or other 
legal authority.63  
In particular, the Seventh Circuit has pushed for “both trial courts 
and appellate courts . . . to research and analyze foreign law 
independently.”64 Bodum epitomizes that approach; the judges 
independently cited a number of treatises and primary source materials 
on French contract law instead of relying on the incomplete foreign 
law materials submitted by the parties.65  
                                                 
59 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. 
60 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 2446 (listing recent cases where 
experts testified as to the scope, meaning, or application of foreign law). 
61 See id. 
62 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. advisory committee’s note. 
63 176 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The Spanish law evidence cited by the 
district court-the affidavit of Bernando Cremades, a prominent Spanish attorney and 
former law professor-provides only very limited support for this measure of 
damages, as Cremades’ declaration cites no cases or legal authority to support his 
construction of [Spanish Law].”). 
64 See United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 699 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
65 See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Second, recent Seventh Circuit decisions take a more critical view 
of expert testimony when compared to cases decided by other circuits. 
Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co. offered the most scathing criticism 
of foreign law experts.66 Sunstar involved an exclusive-use license 
agreement for “Alberto VO5” trademark registrations for shampoo and 
skin-care products in Japan.67 The Japanese buyer-licensee sought a 
declaration that it could use a variation of the VO5 trademark, called a 
senyoshiyoken in Japanese, under the license agreement.68 The 
American seller-licensor sued the buyer-licensee for damages and also 
sought an injunction rescinding the license agreement and a return of 
the VO5 trademarks, which were being held in trust until the license 
agreement expired.69 Although the license agreement stipulated that 
Illinois law governed all disputes arising under the agreement, the 
court analyzed Japanese law to ascertain the meaning of the term 
senyoshiyoken.70 Judge Posner, the author of the Sunstar opinion, 
acknowledged that expert testimony plays a role in most cases 
involving foreign law, but urged judges to consider “superior sources” 
to research the foreign law such as treatises, cases, and law review 
articles.71 He asserted that because “judges are experts on law,” they 
could use primary source materials to determine the foreign law, 
which he felt are more objective than testimony from paid experts, 
which suffer from bias.72 Judge Posner also pointed out that federal 
courts do not allow expert testimony when they apply state law 
(considered “foreign” law because it is not the law of the forum), even 
if Louisiana state law is at issue, which developed out of the French 
                                                 
66 See 586 F.3d 487, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2009). 
67 Id. at 492–93. 
68 Id. at 494. 
69 Id. at 495. 
70 Id. at 497–98. 
71 Id. at 496. 
72 Id. at 495–96 (“But the lawyers who testify to the meaning of foreign law, 
whether they are practitioners or professors, are paid for their testimony and selected 
on the basis of the convergence of their views with the litigating position of the 
client or their willingness to fall in with the views urged upon them by the client.”). 
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Civil Code.73 Although cases in other circuits independently research 
foreign law when the parties do not adequately present the foreign 
law,74 very few express Judge Posner’s confidence in domestic judges’ 
ability to determine foreign law75 or advocate such a restricted use of 
expert testimony.76  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Id. at 495 (“When a court in one U.S. state applies the law of another state, or 
when a federal court applies state law, the court does not permit expert testimony on 
the meaning of the ‘foreign’ law, even if it is the law of Louisiana, which is based to 
a significant degree on the French Civil Code.”). 
74 See, e.g., Jinro Am., Inc. v. Secure Inv., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that district court did not error by not considering declaration of 
Korean legal expert when drafting jury instruction on Korean law); Carlisle 
Ventures, Inc. v. Banco Espanol de Creditor, 176 F.3d. 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(independently researching Spanish law); Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d. 5, 13 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (implying that the trial court should have researched Mexican law when 
the presentations by the parties were insufficient). 
75 Compare Sunstar 586 F.3d at 496 (claiming that judges can accurately 
decide foreign law issues when published legal materials are available because 
“judges are experts on law”), with In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 
373 F.Supp.2d 7, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The lack of judicial expertise and the 
complexity of sources in these two fields-foreign and international law-often make it 
desirable for the court to seek assistance.”). 
76 Compare Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 632 (7th. 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he court doesn't have to rely on testimony; and in only a few cases, I 
believe, is it justified in doing so.”), with Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. 
Ministry of Def. of Republic of Venez., 575 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying on 
English translations of statutes and affidavit from expert explaining the content of 
the foreign law); Jinro Am., 266 F.3d at 1000 (“[A]lthough pursuant to Rule 44.1, 
courts may ascertain foreign law through numerous means, expert testimony 
accompanied by extracts from foreign legal materials has been and will likely 
continue to be the basic mode of proving foreign law.”) (quoting Universe Sales Co. 
v. Silver Castle, Ltd., 182 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999)); Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 
F.3d. 5, 13 (2d Cir 1998) (“We urge district courts [in the Second Circuit] to invoke 
the flexible provisions of Rule 44.1 to determine issues relating to the law of foreign 
nations.”). 
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 C. Ruling as a Question of Law 
 
The last sentence of Rule 44.1 provides that determinations of 
foreign law are considered questions of law.77 Considering foreign law 
as a question of law unquestionably cured some of the most serious 
defects of the fact approach. For example, some cases before Rule 
44.1 viewed the trial court’s determination of foreign law “as a finding 
of fact that could be set aside only if it were clearly erroneous.”78 Such 
cases have no precedential value after Rule 44.1 because the trial 
court’s determination of foreign law is now reviewed de novo, like any 
question of domestic law.79 Owing no deference to the trial court’s 
conclusions, appellate courts may conduct their own research, and 
apply the foreign law to the facts in record.80  
Treating foreign law as a question of law also implies that the 
judge, not the jury, decides the meaning of foreign law. Rule 44.1 does 
not specifically state that judges should determine foreign law issues 
because the enabling act for the Federal Rules prohibits the rules from 
allocating functions between the court and jury. However, the 
Advisory Comments are more explicit, stating, “it has been long 
thought . . . that the jury is not the appropriate body to determine 
issues of foreign law.”81 In addition, the advisory comments note that 
pre-Rule 44.1 cases concluded that judges should determine foreign 
law.82  
                                                 
77 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“The court's determination [of the foreign law 
issue] must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”). 
78 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 2446.  
79 See United. States. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing both 
Federal Rule 44.1 and the parallel rule for foreign issues in criminal law cases for the 
proposition that the lower court’s findings are reviewed do novo).   
80 See, e.g., Aon Fin. Prod., Inc. v. Société Générale, 476 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“[A]ppellate courts, as well as trial courts, may find and apply foreign law.” 
(quoting Curley, 153 F.3d at 12); Kalmich v. Bruno, 732 F.2d 1294, 1300-01 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (appellate courts may use their own research and analysis to resolve the 
foreign law issue).  
81 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. advisory committee’s note. 
82 Id. 
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III. BODUM USA V. LA CAFETIERE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE  
 
 A. Background and Procedural History  
 
The Bodum case involved a dispute over the interpretation of a 
stock purchase agreement (“SPA”) governed by French law.83 
Pursuant to the SPA, Bodum USA, Inc. (“Buyer”) acquired all the 
stock of Societe des Anciens Establissements Martin S.A. (“Se
European company that distributed a popular style of French-press 
coffee maker.
ller”), a 
                                                
84 Restrictive covenants in the SPA expressly disallowed 
the Seller (or its related companies and shareholders) from using the 
“Melior” and “Chambord” trademarks associated with the design of 
the coffee maker but expressly allowed the Seller to distribute 
products similar to the coffee maker outside of France.85 Specifically, 
the SPA language that was issue, translated into English from French, 
stated: 
 
In consideration of the compensation paid to Stockholder for 
the stocks of [Seller,] Stockholder guarantees, limited to the 
agreed compensation, see Article 2, that he shall not – for a 
period of four (4) years –be engaged directly or indirectly in 
any commercial business related to manufacturing or 
distributing [Seller’s] products. . . . 
Notwithstanding Article 4 [Buyer] agrees that Stockholder 
through [an entity related to the Seller] . . . can manufacture 
and distribute any products similar to [Seller’s] products 
outside of France. It is expressly understood that . . . [the 
affiliate] is not entitled, directly, or indirectly, to any such 
activity in France, and that Household . . . furthermore is not 
entitled, directly or indirectly, globally to manufacture and / 
or distribute coffeepots under the trade marks and / or brand 
 
83 See Bodu  USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624 (7th. Cir. 2010). m
. 
85 Id. at 627–28.  
84 Id. at 625
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names of “Melior” and “Chambord,” held by [Seller]. 
Stockholder agrees that [Seller] . . . is not entitled to use for a 
period of four (4) years the importers, distributors, and agents 
which [Seller] uses and/or has used the last year. Any 
violation of these obligations will constitute a breach of 
Stockholder’s obligation according to Article 4.86 
 
Fifteen years after the SPA was executed, the Buyer filed a lawsuit 
in Denmark against the Danish affiliate of the Seller.87 The Buyer 
alleged that the Danish affiliate violated the SPA by selling products 
embodying the Chambord design in Denmark.88 The Danish court 
ruled against the Buyer on the ground that the SPA expressly 
authorized the Danish company to distribute products similar to the 
Chambord in Denmark.89 The Buyer appealed, but the Western Danish 
High Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.90  
While the Danish lawsuit was pending, the Buyer had also sued 
La Cafetiere, Inc. (another entity related to the Seller) in federal 
district court in Chicago.91 The Buyer again claimed that an affiliate of 
the Seller was using the Chambord trade dress without authorization.92 
The Buyer lost in Chicago as well: The district court granted La 
Cafetiere’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the SPA 
authorized La Cafeteiere to sell products similar to the Chambord 
design in the U.S.93 
 
 
                                                 
86 Id. 
87 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 2 Bodum USA, 621 F.3d 624 (No. 09-1892). 
2009 WL 4831860. 
88 Bodum USA, 621 F. 3d at 630. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., No. 07 C 6302, 2009 WL 
804050 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2009). 
92 Id. 
93 See id. at *8 (holding that the SPA reflected an intent to permit La Cafetiere 
to sell products similar to the Chambord in the United States).  
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 B. The Decision  
 
The Buyer appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit. It asserted 
that the district court improperly interpreted the SPA under French law 
because Article 1156 of the French Civil Code requires a court to 
“seek what the common intention of the contracting parties was, rather 
than pay attention to the literal meaning of the terms [in the 
contract].”94 The owner of the Buyer submitted an affidavit stating 
that he thought the SPA restricted the Seller to selling products simila
to the Chambord in other markets,
r 
 
on 
-
 
emark.  
                                                
95 despite the seemingly 
unambiguous language in the SPA that restricted the Seller from doing
so in France only. That meant, according to the Buyer, a trial was 
necessary to determine the parties’ intent and the district court erred by 
granting the motion to dismiss.96 The Buyer buttressed its asserti
with the opinion of a renowned law professor at Universite Pantheon
Assas Paris II. Likewise, La Cafetiere hired experts to support its 
contrary view that the SPA unambiguously allowed the U.S. sale of
French-press products that looked similar to the Chambord design, 
provided that it did not use the “Chambord” trad
The three-judge panel—Judge Easterbrook, Judge Posner, and 
Judge Wood—agreed with La Cafetiere and affirmed the judgment of 
the district court.97 But the holding of Bodum is not what makes the 
case important. The case is noteworthy because all three judges 
disagreed on how courts should evaluate expert opinions submitted by 
the parties to prove foreign law. 
Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the majority opinion, declared that 
“[b]ecause objective, English-language descriptions of French law are 
readily available, we prefer them to the [experts’] declarations.”98 He 
opined “it is no more necessary to resort to expert declarations about 
the law of France than about the law of Louisiana, which had its 
 
94 Bodum USA, 621 F.3d at 628 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1156 (Fr.)). 
95 Bodum USA, 621 F.3d at 628. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 631. 
98 Id. at 629. 
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origins in the French Civil Code.”99 The text of Rule 44.1, wrote 
Judge Easterbrook, “does not compel” judges to consider expert 
testimony.100 Rather, judges can base their decision on any material or
source they find probative and even disregard the material presented 
by the parties if it is presented in a partisan fashion or in insuffic
 
ient 
deta
 law 
 
purpos vailable.103  
Judge Posner wrote separately to further criticize  
 
d in only a few cases, I believe, is it justified in 
doing so.104  
 
 
translations of the relevant French laws105 and also faulted judges for 
                                                
il.101 
Judge Easterbrook opined that English translations of foreign
and scholarly treatises about foreign law were more reliable than 
expert opinions, which must be discounted because experts tend to
slant their opinion to favor the party that pays them.102 However, 
Judge Easterbrook did acknowledge that expert opinions serve a useful 
e if no accepted translations of the foreign law are a
the common and authorized but unsound judicial 
practice . . . of trying to establish the meaning of a law of a 
foreign country by testimony or affidavits of expert 
witnesses, usually lawyers or law professors, often from the 
country in question. . . . [T]he court doesn’t have to rely on 
testimony; an
He criticized the parties for not providing the court with adequate
 
99 Id. at 628. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 629 (“Trying to establish foreign law through experts’ declarations 
not only is expensive . . . but also adds an adversary’s spin, which the court then 
must discount.”). 
103 Id. at 628 (agreeing that expert testimony may be helpful when the judge 
must interpret a statute or decision that is not available in English or covered by 
English-language secondary sources). 
104 Id. at 632. 
105 See id. (“The only evidence of the meaning of French law that was 
presented to the district court or is found in the appellate record is an English 
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relying “on paid witnesses to spoon feed them foreign law that can be 
found well explained in English-language treatises and articles.”106 In 
Judge Posner’s opinion, relying on experts “is excusable only when 
the foreign law is the law of a country with such an obscure or poorly 
developed legal system that there are no secondary materials to which 
the judge could turn.”107  
Although Judge Wood agreed with the majority’s interpretation of 
the SPA, she disagreed with her colleagues’ discussion of Rule 44.1. 
She pointed out that Rule 44.1 does not create a “hierarchy for sources 
of foreign law, and [was] unpersuaded by [her] colleagues’ assertion 
that expert testimony is categorically inferior to published, English-
language materials.”108 Judge Wood noted that English translations of 
the foreign law may not be available or may even be misleading, and 
that relying on such materials could cause the judge to assume the 
foreign law is the same as U.S. law when it is not.109 She reasoned that 
testimony from respected foreign law experts would help the U.S. 
judge understand the full context of the foreign law at issue or avoid 
being mislead by “faux amis”—foreign words or phrases that look 
deceptively similar to English words but have completely different 
meanings.110 The following passage best represents her view of using 
expert testimony in foreign law cases: 
 
Rule 44.1 permits the court to consider ‘any relevant material 
or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a 
party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.’ The 
written sources cited by both of my colleagues throw useful 
light on the problem before us in this case, and both were 
well within their rights to conduct independent research and 
                                                                                                                   
translation of brief excerpts from the French Civil Code and affidavits by three 
French law professors.”).  
106 See id. (Posner, J. concurring). 
107 Id. at 633-34. 
108 Id. at 638. 
. 
110 Id. at 638–39. 
109 Id. at 639
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to rely on those sources. There is no need, however, to 
disparage oral testimony from experts in the foreign law. That 
kind of testimony has been used by responsible lawyers for 
years, and there will be many instances in which it is 
adequate by itself or it provides a helpful gloss on the 
literature. The tried and true methods set forth in FED. R. 
EVID. 702 for testing the depth of the witness's expertise, the 
facts and other relevant information on which the witness has 
relied, and the quality of the witness's application of those 
principles to the problem at hand, suffice to protect the court 
against self-serving experts in foreign law, just as they suffice 
to protect the process for any other kind of expert.111 
 
The court’s disagreement over the use of experts to prove foreign 
law should not be dismissed summarily because it is dicta. The 
divergent views of three influential appellate court judges on how 
domestic courts should determine foreign law will influence the way 
lower courts in the circuit determine foreign law issues. Unfortunately, 
the methodology advanced by Judges Easterbrook and Posner in 
Bodum is flawed. Those judges failed to consider the unique 
challenges domestic judges face when interpreting foreign law, but the 
next Part of this Article does just that. 
 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE BODUM METHODODOLOGY FOR 
ANALYZING FOREIGN LAW ISSUES 
 
Though Judge Easterbook and Judge Posner did nothing wrong by 
performing independent research and discounting the expert testimony 
in Bodum, they were wrong to suggest that judges should do so in 
most cases and that written materials such as English language 
translations of the foreign law are categorically superior to other 
sources of foreign law, including expert testimony.112 Moreover, if 
                                                 
111 Id. at 639. 
112 Id. at 628-29 (asserting that translations and secondary sources are better 
than expert testimony).  
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procedures for determining foreign law were supposed to mirror the 
procedure for determining domestic law (i.e. briefing by the parties 
and independent research by the judge), Rule 44.1 would be 
superfluous. As explained below, the practical challenges of 
determining foreign law generally mean that the judge should not 
summarily dismiss those who have a working knowledge of the 
foreign legal system and rely solely on published foreign law 
materials. 
 
 A. Language Barriers  
 
The purpose of this section is not to analyze every problem 
associated with translating foreign laws—respected authors have done 
so already.113 The more modest goal of this section is to discuss a few 
examples that demonstrate why relying solely on translated legal 
materials is risky. Neither Judge Easterbrook nor Judge Posner 
acknowledged this risk in Bodum even though both relied extensively 
on translated texts.  
The fidelity of translated documents is always a problem because 
languages “never exactly ‘map’ onto one another.”114 In fact, the 
translations of statements of American defendants not fluent in English 
were so commonly inaccurate that Congress passed a statute requiring 
judges to use “certified interpreters” when the defendant cannot speak 
English proficiently.115 In addition, the judge (or translator) could be 
easily mislead by reading words that sound alike in two languages, but 
have different meanings.116 For example, the French word contrat 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Fritz Moses, International Legal Practice, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 
244 (1935) (discussing the difficulty of translating documents from one legal system 
to another); Andrew N. Alder, Translating & Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 37 (discussing translation and interpretation issues). 
114 See Alder, supra note 113 at 46 (using the phrase “I hired a worker” to 
illustrate why phrases do not directly translate from English to Russian due to 
differences in syntax and grammar). 
115 See Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1827(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
116 See Moses, supra note 113 at 250 (“The German word eventuell, for 
instance, does not mean eventually, but perhaps.”).  
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covers what Americans call “conveyances” or “trusts,” but excludes 
other agreements that we label “contracts.”117 Likewise, the word 
“actual” means “existing in fact” in English but the French word 
“actuel” means “present.”118  
The fidelity of translations of foreign law materials is even more 
suspect. The judge must trust that he has a “good” translation of the 
foreign law at issue, which requires that “the merit of the original 
work is so completely transfused into another language, as to be as 
distinctly apprehended, and as strongly felt, by a native of the country 
to which that language belongs, as it is by those who speak the 
language of the original work.”119 But even the most experienced legal 
scholar and translator admits that creating a “good” translation is often 
not possible. In International Legal Practice, Fritz Moses describes 
how one expert translator for the International Congress of 
Comparative Law attached an addendum to his translation that warned 
“[i]t has been virtually impossible to translate literally the above report 
sent out by the Academy, because not only the words, but the forms of 
expression . . . often have no corresponding words or ideas among 
English-speaking peoples.”120  
Though Moses discussed these translation problems in 1939, they 
are still prevalent today. In Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, 
Inc., a Japanese brewer sought an injunction against an American 
liquor distributor in federal district court in New York for allegedly 
infringing its “otokoyama” trademark.121 The distributor argued that 
the district court erred by not considering evidence that the term 
otokoyama was a generic name for sake in Japan and therefore 
ineligible for trademark protection based on the doctrine of “foreign 
                                                 
117 See Alder, supra note 113 at 46–47. 
118 Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 639 (7th. Cir. 2010). 
119 See Zhao Yuhong, Drafting Policy on Bilingual Legislation—Comments on 
the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Bill, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-
01/english/panels/ajls/papers/b1136e01.pdf (last visited May 1, 2011) (quoting 
ALEXANDER TYTLER, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSLATION 15–16 (John 
Benjamins, ed. 1978 reprint). 
120 See Moses, supra note 113 at 248. 
121 See 175 F.3d 266, 268–269 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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equivalents.”122 To make that determination, the court reviewed a 
Japanese Patent Office decision that “apparently” denied trademark 
protection for otokoyama in Japan.123 The brewer submitted three 
different translations of the JPO decision; the importer claimed that all 
three of those translations were incorrect.124 In addition, the court 
considered possibly fraudulent affidavits that stated that otokoyama 
“has no meaning and cannot be translated.”125 If nothing else, Wine of 
Japan Import Inc. emphasizes the point that there is no such thing as a 
perfect translation of foreign law materials. 
Perhaps Judge Easterbook and Judge Posner did not address 
translation errors in Bodum because the parties submitted agreed-upon 
translations of French law.126 That rationale would be consistent with a 
fact approach to foreign law, putting the onus on the parties to present 
the foreign law because the judge is completely unfamiliar with the 
foreign law in the case. But that would not explain the judges’ faith in 
the fidelity of the materials they discovered through independent 
research. Of course, the fact translations may be disputed does not 
mean that the judges should require the parties to submit agreed-on 
translations for every document. Nor should the judge ignore foreign 
law translations and rely slavishly on expert testimony;127 Rule 44.1 
permits the judge to consider any source he or she believes relevant.128 
However, the judge should at least buttress his or her understanding of 
the translation by considering other materials. As Judge Wood stated in 
Bodum, there are many cases where expert testimony “provides a 
helpful gloss” on the literature.129  
                                                 
122 Id. at 268. 
123 Id. at 269. 
124 Id. at 273. 
125 Id. at 269. 
126 See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
127 See Alder, supra note 113 at 38–39 (criticizing judges and lawyers who 
“retain the centuries-old habit of relying to slavishly on tendentious expert 
testimony”). 
128 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9. 
129 See Bodum USA, 621 F.3d at 628.  
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B. Unfamiliarity with the Foreign Legal System 
 
The second problem with relying exclusively on published 
materials is that domestic judges do not have any firsthand knowledge 
of the foreign legal system.130 Even the most respected judges, such as 
Judge Easterbook, Judge Posner, and Judge Wood, are not experts in 
all areas of law. They are experts in American law, particularly as 
applied in Seventh Circuit.131 To reason that a judge can determine the 
law of a foreign country because judges are “experts on law”—as 
Judge Posner did in Sunstar132—is tantamount to reasoning that a 
cardiologist can fix an ACL tear in the knee because doctors are 
experts in medicine, a rather suspect proposition.  
The reality is that American judges view foreign law through an 
American lens (just as French or Canadian judges view American laws 
through the lens of a person from their home jurisdiction).133 The vast 
majority of American judges are accustomed to American law and 
American culture, which often prevents the judge from taking a more 
detached and objective perspective on the foreign law at issue.134 That 
is not a criticism of judges; no person who lacks the life experience in 
the forum can fully understand the foreign law in full context. As 
                                                 
130 See Moses, supra note 113 at 246-247 (giving various examples of how 
differences is culture impact international legal practice).  
131 See id. at 246 (positing that knowledge of the legal system is only one part 
of practicing law and that lawyers cannot “perform our function without a 
knowledge of life itself, of the human relations and of the ideas and ideals which 
move our clients and those with whom we deal.”). 
132 See Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(claiming that judges can accurately decide foreign law issues when published legal 
materials are available because “judges are experts on law”). 
133 See Moses, supra note 113 at 246–47.  
134 See id. at 246 (“Growing up in a certain environment we become 
acquainted with its social currents and crosscurrents and the sentiments and business 
methods of those with whom we are usually concerned in our legal practice.”).  
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Franz Moses aptly noted, “no brilliancy of mind, no learnedness in the 
law could balance lack of such experience.”135 
Because of this inexperience, the judge may assume that the 
institutions of the foreign legal system operate the same way as in the 
United States when that premise is false.136 For example, the premise 
that judicial opinions serve the same function in the French legal 
system as they do the American legal system is false.137 To Americans, 
“the judicial opinion is a valuable legal institution in its own right.”138 
Judicial opinions written by American judges further systematic goals 
that are unique to the American legal system: guiding lawyers and 
other courts, minimizing the risk of arbitrary action by unelected 
judges, promoting transparency, and legitimizing judicial decisions.139 
However, French opinions “are neither reasoned nor candid and make 
no serious effort to realize the goals Americans consider important.”140 
The result is that American and French opinions significantly differ in 
style, structure, and significance.141 American judges strive to write 
well-reasoned and candid opinions, mindful of the need to justify the 
decision and that others will scrutinize the opinion.142 In contrast, 
opinions of the even the highest courts in France are usually a short 
and opaque application of the law to the facts.143 These differences are 
important because the tools the judge uses to analyze domestic law—
                                                 
135 Id. at 246. 
136 See Bodum USA., Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 638 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“[A judge may] assume erroneously that the foreign law mirrors U.S. law 
when it does not.”).  
137 Michael L. Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 81 (1994) (comparing the functions of judicial opinions in France and the 
United States). 
138 Id. at 81. 
139 Id. at 82.  
140 Id. at 84. 
141 Id. at 85–91. 
142 Id. at 87 (stating that one of the purposes of the American legal opinion is 
to persuade others the court has reached the right result).  
143 Id. at 92. 
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precedent, deductive reasoning, guidance from higher courts, etc.—do 
not necessarily help him or her resolve French law.  
Judge Posner has twice justified his methodology by pointing out 
that federal judges do not allow expert testimony in cases involving 
the law of Louisiana or Puerto Rico, which have their origins in 
French and Spanish law respectively.144 However, as Judge Wood 
made clear, there is a meaningful difference between determining the 
law of another American state or territory, which is part of the judges’ 
home legal system, and the law of a foreign country’s system that 
likely has not adopted any part of American law.145 The laws of 
Louisiana and Puerto Rico share a common core with other states far 
more than any foreign country. For instance, Louisiana has adopted 
parts of the Uniform Commercial Code and its procedural rules are 
converging with other (American) states.146 Similarly, Puerto Rico has 
adopted parts of Delaware Corporate law and judges on the First 
Circuit hear cases that involve Puerto Rican law.147 There should be no 
debate that judges are very familiar with the law of these states and 
would not suffer the same lack of experience as they do when deciding 
the law of any other foreign country.148  
 
C. The Law Does Not Always Function As It Is Written 
 
By relying exclusively on written sources of foreign law, the 
unstated assumption Judges Posner and Easterbrook made in Bodum is 
that the law functions the way it is written. That assumption is often 
                                                 
144 See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628–29 (7th. Cir. 
2010) (”It is no more necessary to resort to expert declarations about the law of 
France than the law of Louisiana, which had its origins in the French Civil Code.”); 
Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 586 F.3d 487, 495 (7th Cir. 2009). 
145 Bodum USA, 621 F.3d at 639–40.  
146 Id. at 640. 
147 Id. 
148 That assumption may have been valid when judges were interpreting the 
their law as modified by French and Spanish statutes respectively, but as discussed 
in the text, Louisiana and Puerto Rico are now primarily influenced by United 
States’ law. 
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erroneous. The actual workings of a legal system often depart from 
what the law says, especially in developing countries, where 
governments routinely make decisions based on unpublished laws 
rather than publically accessible regulations.149  
Though the American judges’ role is to interpret the foreign law as 
written, many cases involving foreign law require the court to evaluate 
the actual workings of the foreign legal and political system in order to 
contrast it with the way things work at home. This is true when the 
court considers the validity of a foreign judgment,150 forum selection 
clause in a contract,151 and other cases that contrast procedures of the 
foreign legal system with American notions of due process. 
Currently, China is the preeminent example of how the “law on 
the books” often differs from the “law in action.”152 As part of its 
accession to the World Trade Organization, China has made attempts 
to reform its legal system to respect the rule of law.153 The protection 
of intellectual property has been one of the most crucial areas of 
reform and, in 2000, Chinese authorities promulgated new patent, 
trademark, and copyright laws.154 In addition to the new domestic 
laws, China also signed a number of international treaties covering 
                                                 
149 See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of 
Protection and Predictability, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 615, 622 (1994) (“A particularly 
common and recurring frustration is the obscurity of how the law works in China . . . 
due in part to the government's frequent reliance on a non-public ‘operational code,’ 
rather than on publicly accessible written regulations.”). 
150 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895) (formulating the rule that 
foreign judgments will be upheld only if the foreign legal system is “likely to secure 
an impartial administration of justice”). 
151 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 
346-47 (8th Cir. 1985) (refusing to give effect to forum selection clause purporting 
to give Iranian courts jurisdiction because the American plaintiff could not receive a 
fair trial in Iran). 
152 See Chew, supra note 148 at 621–23 (describing the lack of transparency of 
Chinese foreign investment law in the 1990s). 
153 See Eu J. Chuan, The Laws of the People’s Republic of China: An 
Introduction to International Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 133, 134 (2006) (“China is 
in transition from a state-controlled system of administrative fiat to one that respects 
the rule of law.”).  
154 Id. at 149–50. 
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intellectual property law, including the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property.155 Despite these attempts at reform, 
many observe that Chinese courts lack the desire and impetus to 
enforce intellectual property laws as written and widespread piracy, 
counterfeiting, and infringement still occurs.156  
Chinese anti-monopoly laws provide another example of how an 
American judge could not fully understand the relevant law without 
assistance from a local expert. In 2008, China adopted new anti-
monopoly laws (“AML”) based loosely on American and European 
models.157 Many practitioners expressed concern that  facially neutral 
provisions of the AML could be enforced in unfair ways against 
foreign companies.158 Less than one year after the AML went into 
effect, Coca-Cola announced a $2.4 billion acquisition of Huiyuan 
Juice Group, the largest producer of orange juice in China.159 The 
Ministry of Commerce rejected the bid on antitrust grounds, releasing 
a statement that the acquisition would have hurt local orange juice 
producers and resulted in higher prices for Chinese consumers.160 The 
announced rationale seemed disingenuous to western investors and 
                                                 
155 Id. at 150. 
156 Id. at 155 (“Often, the difficulty has not been the lack of laws, but rather, 
both the ability to enforce these laws consistently and public noncompliance in a 
country where such rights were traditionally nonexistent. As China’s economy 
develops and many of its business enterprises create their own intellectual property 
that require protection, there will be an increasing desire and impetus to ensure that 
all intellectual property rights—regardless of their origin—are protected.”). See also 
Peter K. Yu., From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property 
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 875-994 (2006) (analyzing prominent 
cases in China where the failure to enforce written intellectual property laws has 
prevented effective protection of intellectual property). 
157 Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: 
Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 379, 397–99 (2009) 
(discussing the influence on United States and European Union antitrust law on the 
AML). 
158See e.g.,Peter J. Wang and Yizhe Zhang, New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 
JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS (last visited April 10, 2011), 
http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=4662. 
159 Bill Powell, China Says 'Keep Out' to Coca-Cola, TIME (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1886024,00.html. 
160 Id. 
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Beijing antitrust lawyers since the combined market share of orange 
juice would have been around 20% after the merger.161  
Correcting the growing pains of the Chinese legal system is 
probably best left to the Chinese legal system or international trade 
organizations, and is surely not the problem of the domestic judge. 
Nevertheless, judges cannot ignore the realities of the legal system and 
read only the texts if he or she wants to apply Chinese law as a court in 
China would. In addition, when the court is required to evaluate the 
actual workings of the legal system in order to contrast it with the way 
things work in the United States,162 the court should not ignore the 
discrepancy. For example, if a Chinese company won damages in a 
Chinese antitrust claim against an American company and attempted 
to have the judgment enforced by a American court, the American 
company may have an argument that the judgment should not be 
enforced because the discrepancy between written laws and the way 
things work is inconsistent with American notions of due process.163 
 
D. Using Rule 44.1’s Guidelines to Overcome the Challenges of 
Determining Foreign Law 
 
Fortunately, federal judges already have a methodology that gives 
them the confidence and competence to overcome the challenges 
discussed in the previous Section. Rule 44.1 gives federal judges the 
blueprint they need to make legitimate, informed determinations of 
foreign law.164 In many cases, the judge will chose to independently 
                                                 
161 Id. (“From a purely competitive point of view, [the Coca-Cola acquisition] 
would not have affected the [non-alcoholic beverage] market.”).  
162 See supra, footnotes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
163 Id. Similarly, state-controlled trade associations in China blur the line 
between private and public entities for purposes of affirmative defenses based on the 
sovereignty of foreign states. See Laura Zimmerman, Sovereignty-Based Defenses in 
Antitrust Cases Against Chinese Manufacturers: Making Room For Diplomacy. 36 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 337 (2010) (reviewing the AML and arguing that American 
courts should construe sovereignty defenses asserted by Chinese companies for 
public policy reasons). 
164 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; see also Miller, supra note 2, at 749 (“[Rule 44.1] 
offers parties and trial judges a highly malleable scheme for raising, proving, and 
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research the law and disregard the testimony of foreign law experts, as 
Judge Easterbrook and Posner advocate.165 But in many other cases 
the experts selected by the parties may provide insights about the 
foreign law that the judge might otherwise miss.166 The problem with 
the methodology advanced in Bodum is that it reads out the flexibility 
of Rule 44.1 by instructing judges to rely exclusively on published 
materials if they are available.167  
In addition, a more holistic view of Rule 44.1 is most consistent 
with the purpose of the federal rules: “the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination” of disputes.168 While experts can certainly 
add expense and delay in certain cases, lower courts do not have the 
resources to ignore expert opinions on foreign law. Simply put, the 
Seventh Circuit is better positioned to wade through scholarly articles 
on foreign legal systems, or other sources that the panel of judges 
thinks relevant.169 The comparative lack of resources of federal district 
courts does not excuse them from failing to seek out sources that allow 
them to determine foreign law accurately. Nor does it excuse them 
from having experts “spoon feed” them the foreign law,170 but it does 
                                                                                                                   
determining foreign law that is compatible with the clarion for the ‘just, speedy, and 
inexpensive’ administration of justice sounded in Federal Rule 1.”).  
165 See supra Part II (explaining Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner’s 
methodology for determining foreign law). 
166 See supra Part II.D. (discussing how American judges’ lack of direct 
experience in the foreign country often prevents them from understanding the 
meaning and applicability of the foreign law). 
167 See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text. 
168 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules] should be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”). 
169 Judge Wood argues makes a general efficiency argument against having 
judges search through volumes on foreign law materials. See Bodum USA, Inc. v. La 
Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 639 (7th. Cir. 2010). Certainly, appellate courts have 
more resources to conduct independent research on the foreign law than do federal 
district courts. 
170 See, e.g,. Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 634(7th Cir. 
2010) (warning judges not to rely on foreign law experts to “spoon feed them foreign 
law”). 
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mean that lower courts need to streamline the process. Moreover, 
listening to experts from the foreign jurisdiction and then critically 
comparing the expert’s opinion with other sources of law (including 
official translations and articles) is more efficient than wading through 
thousands of pages of documents. At the very least, the expert’s 
opinion will allow the trial court judge to hone in on the outcome 
determinative foreign law issues that must be researched elsewhere.  
No matter what methodology the court uses to determine foreign 
law in a particular case, the purpose of Rule 44.1 is to achieve “a 
sound result . . . with fairness to the parties.”171 Lower court judges 
should be free to determine what will achieve that result on a case-by-
case basis, provided the chosen methodology fits within the guidelines 
of Rule 44.1. The most egregious flaw of the methodology advanced 
in Bodum is that it does not allow the judge to decide what sources of 
foreign law will fulfill the purpose of Rule 44.1 under the 
circumstances. Just as courts were mistaken to insist on formal 
pleading standards because doing so was consistent with treating 
foreign law as a question of fact,172 two of the three judges in Bodum 
were mistaken to insist that the judge independently research 
unfamiliar foreign law when published materials are available.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Judges confront challenges in foreign law cases that they do not 
face when determining domestic law. The purpose of Rule 44.1 is to 
provide flexible procedures for addressing those challenges and 
achieve a sound result in the case in a way that is fair to the parties. 
One of those procedures permits the judge to consider expert 
testimony. The arguments offered here hardly compel the conclusion 
that the judge should consider expert testimony in every case. But they 
should leave some doubt that relying nearly exclusively on written 
sources of foreign law will lead to accurate and consistent decisions in 
foreign law cases. The court should not dismiss the challenges of 
                                                 
171 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. advisory committee’s note. 
172 See Miller, supra note 2 at 748. 
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interpreting foreign law so casually if it hopes to resolve future cases 
that involve the law of a foreign country competently. 
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